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Abstract 
A large number of modern consumer focussed industries are characterised by fast paced 
technology driven innovations -  smart phones and other computing devices, software, home audio 
and video technologies, automobiles, pharmaceuticals etc. being a few notable examples. Such 
industries are research driven and are characterised by their unique technological ecosystems. 
Competition within such industries is not limited to pricing and marketing strategies alone, but is 
driven by R&D as well, whereby new features, new variants and upgraded technology is c onstantly 
being introduced to attract customers (Frambach, 1993). Consequently, firms often tend to use the 
existing intellectual property (IP) frame work  within their industries as a standard tool against rivals 
– both for defensive and offensive purposes (Litchenber, 2002).  
This paper focuses on industries engaged in “sequential innovations”, where new innovations are 
possible by investing in R&D to improve existing stock of technology (Bessen, 2009), and  examines 
using agent based models, the impact of alternative IP protection norms and regulations on – first, 
the evolutionary path of technology development and emerging market structure, and second, the 
dynamics of technology progress and the nature of  competition in technology as a function of the 
IP protection frame work. 
We examine three alternative IP protection frameworks – Open Access (OA), Patent Licensing (PL) 
and Secrecy (S), and compare their impact on the dynamic evolution of both firm and industry level 
technology and competition using agent based simulations. Firms in the model invest in R&D in 
every period to improve the existing stock of technology, where the existing stock could be their 
own or a rival’s past technology, and the IP regime determines the strategies available for exchange 
of technology stock between rival firms (for example, copying, licensing, reverse engineering etc.). 
Firms use a simple profit based reinforcement learning algorithm to choose the frequency with 
which they use the available strategies under each regime. How much they invest in improving the 
stock depends on past profitability, and the outcome of this investment is stochastic in nature. A 
parameter   controls the stochastic nature of research outcome – with high values of   making 
bigger jumps in technology more probable for a given level of investment. Budget conscious 
heterogeneous consumers in the simulations base their purchase decisions every period, on the 
level of technology in the product they currently use, levels of technology available in the new 
products and on price. Consumers invest in a new product, only if the available products represent a 
significant jump in technology compared to the existing product they are using. This is represented 
through a threshold parameter    -  high value of which indicates that consumers are conservative in 
their purchases, and would require the new technology to be significantly better than their existing 
ones for them to consider making a purchase. Apart from    and       we also test the effects of size 
of the market (number of consumers) and size of competition (number of firms) on the outcome of 
the model. The patent and secrecy regimes are characterized by a few additional parameters, such 
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as probability of successful infringement, royalty fee, penalty of unsuccessful infringement in case 
of PL and reverse engineering cost in case of S. 
Results indicate that both    and   affect the technology trajectory of the industry. Lower 
conservativeness in consumers results in higher levels of technology overall, ac ross all IP 
frame works. Moreover, lower conservativeness in consumers implies that the technology trajectory 
is a step function of time, where there are episodes of marginal incremental progress inter-spaced 
with rare large jumps in technology levels. In terms of market structure, increased conservativeness 
in consumers result in more egalitarian distribution of market shares, where no single firm is able to 
dominate the market, and even if one of them does dominate, is not able to maintain its dominance 
for too long a period. Hence, higher values of   result a in smoothening of the technology trajectory 
itself although at the cost of overall technology level achieved in the industry . Along with it, we see 
higher levels of competition and coexistence of rival firms in the market. As expected, increasing   
results in higher levels of technology overall, but contrary to expectation, increases the length of 
incremental progress episodes in the technology trajectory. In all cases, the presence of a single 
dominant firm slows down the overall pace of technology progress within an industry, coinciding 
with episodes of incremental improvement. However, the largest jumps in technology occur when 
one dominant firm is overtaken by a previously smaller player thro ugh introduction of a ne w 
technology which is adopted by a large number of consumers. A comparison of the regimes 
themselves showed that, in general, higher levels of technology are reached  and higher levels of 
investment in R&D are carried out, when the industry is characterised by OA or PL, compared to S.  
Additionally, the size of the market has a positive impact on the industry level investment in R&D 
and technology and the number of firms has a negative overall impact on both.  Within the patent 
regime, weakening the enforcement structure (in terms of increased probability of firms being able 
to infringe a patent successfully), enhances technological progress and inter firm technology 
transfer. Within the secrecy regime, increasing reverse engineering costs result in decline in 
technology progress and R&D investments in the industry.  
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